

things for myself, which naturally made much difference between us! Indeed I was not a little surprised to find that the Emperor was by no means as great a character in Berlin as outsiders supposed him to be, and that both the men highest in politics and the Administration, and the people at large, took evident pleasure in having him understand that he was not supreme, and that he must yield to the will of the Nation on any point as to which the Nation had decided views. Von Tirpitz was particularly interested in the voyage of the battlefleet round the world, and he told me frankly that he had not believed we could do it successfully, and added that your (the English) Naval Office and Foreign Office had felt the same way—which I told him I knew. He then said that he expected that Japan would attack us while the fleet was on its way round, and asked me if I had not also expected this. I told him that I had not expected such an attack, but that I had thought it possible ; in other words, that I thought the chances were against it, but there was a chance for it.

My point of view at the time the fleet sailed, was that if the Japanese attacked it, it was a certain sign that they were intending to attack us at the first favorable opportunity. I had been doing my best to be polite to the Japanese, and had finally become uncomfortably conscious of a very, very slight undertone of veiled truculence in their communications in connection with things that happened on the Pacific Slope; and I finally made up my mind that

they thought I was afraid of them. Through an
ex-member
of the Dutch Cabinet, and, rather curiously,
through two
of the Austrian secretaries of Embassy—all at
or from
Tokio—I found that the Japanese war party
firmly believed
that they could beat us, and, unlike the Elder
Statesmen,
thought I also believed this. Then Ian
Hamilton (whose
"Staff Officer's Note Book" I think particularly
valuable)
wrote me congratulating me upon my efforts
to keep the
peace, and adjuring me by all means to do so,
and not under
any circumstances to let America get drawn
into war with
Japan until industrialism had time to eat
out the Jap-